Abstract. Under the bookbuilding procedure, the investment banker asks institutional investors how many shares they would like to buy and the maximum price they are willing to pay. After collecting the information, the investment banker uses it to price the issue and to allocate shares among the investors. We examine the books from 39 international issues. For each issue we look at the bids and the corresponding allocation. We infer some of the criteria the investment banker uses in order to allocate shares. Our results have implications for the various theories related to the underpricing of initial public o erings.
Introduction
Before issuing equity on the primary market, investment bankers try to gauge the level of demand from institutional investors. It is becoming increasingly common to build a book" before pricing equity issues. Under the bookbuilding procedure, investors tell the banker the number of shares that they would like to purchase. The investors' bids frequently include a maximum price or other details. After collecting all the information, the investment banker can draw a demand curve and use it to help determine the size, price and allocation of the o ering. Typically, the price is set so that the issue will beoversubscribed. The investment banker will have complete discretion in deciding how to ration shares among the di erent i n v estors|there is no requirement to be`fair'.
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The process resembles a uniform-price auction, but di ers in some very important ways. The rst di erence is that bids are non-binding. However, it is very unusual for a bidder to renege on a bid. A bidder who does not honor his bid is usually excluded from receiving shares in future issues.
The important di erences between bookbuilding and an auction are in pricing and allocation procedures. In bookbuilding, the price is not set by any explicit rule, but rather at a level determined by the investment banker after observing the entire demand curve. Similarly, shares are not rationed according to any explicit rule, but again at the discretion of the investment banker.
One can imagine possible allocation rules; for example, allocating shares to the bidders with the highest bid prices or allocating shares on a pro rata basis to all bidders who demand shares at the issue price. However, in bookbuilding, a bidder who submitted a bid with a high limit price or no limit price may not get a better allocation than a similar bidder with a lower limit price. In fact, one or both of the bidders may b e allocated no shares at all.
It is precisely the allocation decision that is the focus of this paper. Although there is no explicit rule how to ration shares in oversubscribed issues, it is important to understand the criteria that the banker uses when making these decisions. Most of the literature on initial public o erings IPOs addresses the question of pricing. However, the theoretical literature on underpricing in IPOs also makes empirical predictions about allocations. By looking at how the investmentank allocates shares, we can then test for these theories.
We examine the bookfor 39 international issues from a major European investment bank. For each issue, we have the bid details of each bidder and the nal allocations. Kandel, Sarig and Wohl 1997 and Biais and Faugeron-Crouzet 1998 also study data set in which they can observe the whole demand for the shares, as we can. However, in their case the shares are sold through an auction or an auction like mechanism, where it is speci ed in advance how the shares will beallocated as a function of the bids. In our case, allocation is purely discretional, and we can use these data to determine the allocation criteria of the investment bank. We can then see which theories are consistent with our ndings . For example, it has been suggested that the investment bank discriminates in favor of small bidders in order to obtain di use ownership, or in favor of the informed investors in order to induce them to reveal their information, or of the early bidders to create a cascade Welch, 1989 , or in favor of regular customers to create a reputation Benveniste and Spindt, 1989. We consider various aspects of the bids. Some aspects are the same as in an auction such as the size of the bid or the maximum price pershare. Other bid aspects are used by the investment bank to decide on allocations in a way that deviates from a normal auction and would beconsistent with some of the theories. We nd that the investment banker discriminates in favor of investors which w e identify as informed or regular investors. In the case of informed investors the investment bank just allocates more shares, but in the case of regular investors the investment bank allocates more shares when the issue is oversubscribed, i.e. whan it has most chances of being successful.
In the next section, we review the theoretical literature and its empirical implications. In Section 3 we discuss the bookbuilding process, and provide some descriptive statistics from the data. Section 4 contains the empirical analysis and Section 5 concludes.
IPO literature
In this section we review some of the theories about IPOs and their empirical implications. This overview of the literature does not intend to be exhaustive: we consider only theories whose empirical implications can betested with our data. As explained in the introduction, our data set allows us to better test some theories of underpricing|for example because it allows us to better distinguish between informed and uninformed investors, or to identify regular clients. However, some explanations for underpricing for example, the need to return to the market or the potential for a l a wsuit have implications that are not as directly relevant to our tests.
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A large part of the explanations of underpricing focus on informational asymmetries. Rock 1986 assumes that both the issuing rm and the underwriter are uninformed about the true value of the shares on o er, while investors can beboth uninformed or informed. Given the presence of informed investors, uninformed investors face a winner's curse; they stand a greater chance of being allocated stock in overpriced rather than in rationed underpriced otations. The solution is underpricing. In order to judge whether investors can pro t from the underpricing, one should adjust for rationing, which requires to look at the actual allocation of shares to the various investors. An empirical implication is that the winner's curse could be reduced if the shares were sold only to informed investors, or, in other words, that underpricing should increase with the ex ante price uncertainty surrounding an issue. Most empirical studies identify informed investors as institutional investors: the Securities and Exchange Commission 1971 found that institutional investors do not receive preferential treatment in oversubscribed issues. Moreover, Weiss Hanley and Wilhelm 1995 nd that there is no di erence in the size of the allocations institutional investors receive in underpriced and overpriced issue. It is not clear, however, that institutional investors are necessarily more informed or, at least, some may be more informed than others. In the issues we study, there are only institutional investors and we will look for more precise ways to identify the informed investors.
In the winner's curse model, rationing is not chosen by the investment banker in a strategic way. As a matter of fact, if the bank could identify the uninformed investors and discriminate in their favor in the oversubscribed issues, then the problem would be mitigated. Since in the bookbuilding procedure a very important role is played by the allocation of shares, it should be taken into account in the modelling. Both Spatt and Srivastava 1991 and Spindt 1989 model the issuing process as a bookbuilding procedure. They show that, in presence of informed investors, underpricing and rationing can beused to design a mechanism that ensures truthful revelation of the information they possess. Although it is not possible to eliminate underpricing altogether, the investment banker can reduce it by using his access to well-informed investors. However, in order to induce investors to reveal the information they possess, the investment banker has to promise them a more favorable treatment.
Spatt and Srivastava 1991 also show that although the investors' manifestations of interest are non-binding, if the pricing and allocation rule satisfy incentive compatibility, the investors will not renege on their bids. However, they consider the case where these rules are announced in advance. As we already explained, one characteristic of bookbuilding is that there is no speci c rule. Benveniste and Spindt 1989 explain the advantage of having no set rule in that the bank can choose to allocate shares as a function of both the current bid and any other bid the investor made in previous issues. In particular, the investment banker minimizes underpricing by giving priority t o regular investors in exchange for them buying shares in under-subscribed o ers.
Welch 1992 shows that if later investors can observe h o w w ell an o ering has sold to date, investors approached after some time can infer information from investors who were approached earlier.
order to ensure that the earliest investors will participate.
Finally, the issuing company m a y b e w orried about ownership and control issues. Brennan and Franks 1997 present a model in which managers want to avoid any large stake being assembled by single investor. By underpricing the otation, they can insure that the o er is over-subscribed and that investors will be rationed. Rationing, in turns, allows managers to discriminate between applicants of di erent sizes and to reduce the block size of new shareholders. The implication is that the rationing should favor investors who demand a lower amount of shares. However, Brennan and Franks consider private placements when large blockholdings might be a more signi cant issue.
3. Description of the data and of the procedure We consider 39 international equity issues, which took place between 1995 and 1997. Because of the high xed cost of the procedure, bookbuilding is used mostly for large issues, usually international issues which are sold in di erent countries simultaneously.
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Of the 39 issues, 23 are primary issues and 16 are secondary issues. Fourteen of the 39 issues are privatizations some as IPOs but most as later tranches. It may seem unnecessary to build a book for seasoned equity issues; since shares are already quoted, there should be no need to collect additional information to determine the price. However, in these cases either the shares were illiquid or the size of the issue was very large relative to the number of shares already traded a numberwere second or third tranches of large privatizations. The investment banker felt that the new issue would have moved the market and proceeded in the same way as for IPOs. Therefore, we include these issues in our study.
We complemented all the data in the book by collecting the preliminary and nal prospectuses of the issues and with data from Bloomberg including aftermarket prices.
On average, the issues were underpriced by 2.4 relative to the rst available postissue secondary market price. IPOs were underpriced 2.0 and secondary issues were 5 US domestic issues also use a form of bookbuilding but in a much less detailed way.
underpriced by 2.9. 6 However, the relatively high underpricing for the secondary issues is driven by one outlying privatization.
For each issue, besides the o ering information quantity o ered, issue price, etc. we have all the bids from the potential buyers and the nal allocation of shares to them.
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The bookcontains each bid submitted, including the identity of the bidder, the number of shares requested as well as a limit price if the bidder speci ed one. In addition, the book contains the rst date when the bid was entered and any subsequent change or cancellation of the bid. It also records the manager who received the bid and the tranche requested, when there are multiple tranches.
The bookdistinguishes between three types of bids. A strike bid" is a market order: an order for a speci c number of shares regardless of the issue price. Bids can also be denominated in currency units e.g. 5 million worth of shares.
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A limit bid" is a limit order: the bidder speci es the maximum price that he is willing to pay for the shares. In a step bid" the bidder submits a demand schedule as a step function.
While the b o o k i s o p e n , bidders may freely revise or even cancel their bids. An example of the rst ten bids in an actual limit book are shown in Table 1 . For this issue, the rst bidder expressed an interest in purchasing $1 million worth of shares. The bid was a strike bid | he is willing to pay any issue price. However, because the bid was expressed in currency units rather than shares, his demand for shares is lower at higher prices. In contrast, bidder 10 asked for 1000 shares regardless of the price. The only limit order in this part of the bookwas submitted by bidder 7 who requested 20,000 shares at a maximum price of 72. Bidder 5 submitted a step bid specifying 10,000 shares for a price of 69 or lower, but only 5000 shares if the 6 The average for the entire sample is statistically signi cantly di erent from zero at the 5 level, but the underpricing for the IPO and secondary subsamples are not statistically signi cant. 7 The book does not contain the retail demand, which is handled completely separately. 8 The bid may b e i n a n y currency. We h a v e translated such amount in the currency of the issuer using the exchange rate at the issue date, which is the procedure actually followed by the investment bank. price will be above 69, and an absolute price limit of 75. Note that bidders 4 and 9 revised their original bids.
After the deadline for submitting bids, just before the issue, the investment banker aggregates all the bid information and chooses the issue price. Typically, the price is set so that the total demand is larger than the numberof shares o ered. Figure  1 shows the oversubscription at the issue price for the issues in our sample. The median oversubscription corresponds to a total demand of approximately three times the total supply. There are however some very heavily oversubscribed issues | up to 22 times the numberof shares o ered.
Once the issue price is set, the investment banker decides how to allocate the total numberof shares among the investors. As explained earlier, the investment banker does not follow an explicit rule. Table 2 shows the allocations for a group of bidders all of whom submitted bids for 20,000 shares. First of all, it is evident that the banker is not following a strict priority rule. The limit bids are awarded shares even though the strike bids have not received a 100 allocation. Similarly, the limit bid of 71 was awarded shares even though the higher limit bid of 72 still has un lled demand. It is also noteworthy that the bidders are not being rationed equally. The awards range from 5000 shares to 12,200 shares even though all the bidders requested the same quantity.
In fact, it is not unusual for a bidder who requested fewer shares to beawarded more shares than a larger bidder. For example, in Table 2 bidder 94 requested 20,000 shares and was awarded 5000. However in the same issue another bidder requested 10,000 shares and was awarded 6100. Also, in the example, the bidder with the higher limit price was awarded more shares than the one with the lower limit price. However, the banker often reverses the order and awards more shares to the bidder with the lower limit price. Moreover, some bidders are awarded no shares at all. Figure 2 shows the demand curve for the same issue. In total, just under 1.3 million shares were issued. However, even at a price of 80, the bids totalled 2.28 million shares. The choice of 71 as the issue price was not set anywhere near the point where the supply crosses the demand curve. In this case, it is set just at the point where the demand curve begins its steepest descent. It appears as if the investment banker is more in uenced by the slope of the demand curve than by its absolute level.
In our sample of 39 issues, the issuing companies come from 20 di erent countries and bidders come from 61 countries. Each bidder can make a bid in any currency it chooses. There are 19 di erent currencies used, although most currency bids are in US dollars and British pounds.
The average number of nal bids per issue is 295 and the median is 264 excluding cancelled bids. The actual numberof nal bids ranges from 57 to 896. Many bids get revised; on average there are .64 revisions perinitial bid and 4.8 of all initial bids were ultimately cancelled by the bidder.
There are 7088 unique bidders in the data set and on average each bidder participated in 1.85 issues. While the large majority of the bidders bid only once or few more times, there are more than 100 bidders that took part in at least 10 issues. Of the nal bids, 80 are strike bids, 16.6 are limit bids and 3.4 are step.
In the next section, we will try to study how the rationing of investors' demands depends on some characteristics. We will look at the size of each bid or allocation. However, issues vary considerably in size. Moreover, quantities are not directly comparable since the size of each share varies across the issues. Therefore, we de ne bid and allocation sizes as percentages relative to the aggregate bids and aggregate allocations. Four variables will be central to the analysis. The rst is the percentage bid, i.e. the ratio of a bid to the sum of all bids. The second one is the percentage allocation, i.e. the allocation to one bidder as a percentage of the total number of shares allocated. The third one is the rationing, i.e. the ratio of each allocation to the corresponding bid. The fourth is the ratio of the percentage bid to the percentage allocation which we call normalized rationing. This last variable is used because we would expect the raw rationing i.e. the ratio of allocation to bid would below in heavily oversubscribed issues and would behigh in less oversubscribed issues. Normalized rationing is the same as the rationing multiplied by the oversubscription. If the investment banker rations fairly", i.e. satisfying all bidders in proportion to their bids, then this variable will equal 100. Any deviation in the normalized rationing from 100 represents discrimination in favor or against some bidders.
We compute the averages of the variables by rst taking the average for each issue and then taking the average across all issues.
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Because the percentage bid must sum to one for each issue, the average is simply the average of 1 N j across the 39 issues where N j is the number of bidders in issue j. Thus, the average percentage bid is 0.6278. Similarly, the average percentage allocation is also 0.6278.
The average rationing is 28.45. The average normalized rationing is 71.75. The fact that the average normalized rationing is below 100 already suggests that shares are not being distributed fairly," but that larger bidders receive more favorable allocations. When a xed number of shares are diverted from a small bidder to a large bidder, the normalized rationing for the large bidder increases slightly above 100, but the normalized rationing for the small bidder decreases far below 100. Thus, the equally weighted average is below 100. Figure 3 gives an example of the distribution of bids, allocations and rationing for a single issue.
Data Analysis
In this section we study whether the allocation of shares depends on some characteristics of the bids or bidders. The investment banker rst chooses a price after observing the book. We assume that the pricing decision is not made to in uence the distribution of the shares.
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Once the issue price has been chosen, the total oversubscription of the issue is determined and the investment banker must decide how to allocate the shares among the bidders. 9 In other words, if x ij is one of these variables for bidder i in issue j, the average is given by 10 For example, we exclude the possibility that the investment banker would set a low price in order to ensure that a particular limit order is hit.
In order to examine each characteristic individually, we construct some tables presenting the rationing conditional upon those characteristics. Secondly, w e present regression results to test for multiple characteristics, and we look for di erences between IPOs and secondary issues. Finally, w e study whether the favourable treatment in terms of shares is also re ected in higher returns.
4.1. Tables. The rst question is whether the investment banker discriminates in favor of large or small bids. In Table 3 we divide the data into four quartiles based on the size of the bid.
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The averages of the four variables | percentage bid, percentage allocation, rationing and normalized rationing is shown for each quartile. By construction, the percentage bid is increasing over the quartiles. Similarly, as one would expect, larger bidders are awarded more shares in absolute terms. More importantly, we nd that large bidders are favored by being awarded a larger fraction of their bids than small bidders. This result holds across all four quartiles, but most strikingly for the third and fourth i.e. largest quartiles. It appears that the investment banker is discriminating in favor of the largest bidders.
This seems to show that the issuing company is not worried about the formation of large blocks. In fact, even in the largest quartile, the average percentage allocation is approximately 2: control in these large issues is not an issue. On average, the investment banker allocates more shares to those who demand more, as predicted by Spatt and Srivastava 1989 . This is however di erent from Keloharju 1998, which nds that small orders have a relatively more favorable treatment. Both Spindt 1989 and Spatt and Srivastava 1991 argue that the main use of bookbuilding is to extract information from the informed investors, giving some rents in exchange for truthful revelation. In a standard auction, bids are uni-dimensional, so the only way to reveal information is by bidding a higher or lower amount. In bookbuilding, bids can be of a few types some of which reveal more information. We test whether the investment banker discriminates in favor of these bids.
Bidders can submit strike, limit or step bids. While strike bids inform the banker about the market's demand for the stock, limit bids also provide speci c information about the elasticity of that demand. In fact, if all bids were strike bids, the aggregate demand would be perfectly horizontal or with a slight slope because of the strike bids denominated in currency and the bookwould provide no indication of how to price the issue. If investors who provide information should receive a rent, we should nd that a limit bid is treated more favorably. Similarly, a step bid provides price information.
Along the same lines, any investor can easily submit a strike bid. A limit bid suggests that the investor has performed analysis to become informed about the share's value. By comparing the limit bid to other limit bids, the investment banker can even gauge the accuracy of the bidder's information.
An alternative h ypothesis would be that the investment banker prefer strike bids as they allow the banker more freedom in choosing the price and allocating shares.
In Table 4 we compare strike bids, limit bids and step bids. As measured by the normalized rationing, we see that limit bids are favored relative to strike bids.
Step bids are even more favored, but the small numberof step bids makes this result less strong.
The second row of Table 4 shows that the average percentage bids are larger for limit and step bids relative to strike bids. Since we have already seen that large bids are treated favorably, w e h a v e t o c heck that we are not simply capturing a size e ect. Table 5 separates large and small bids. Large bids are de ned as the larger half of all bids in an issue and small bids are de ned as the smaller half. Both among the large bids and the small bids, limits bids and step bids are favored relative to strike bids. This supports the theory that investment bankers reward informed bidders for revealing their information. Note that the di erence between limit and strike bids is more prominent among the large bids. This suggests that a large limit bid is more informative than a small limit bid.
Another di erence between bids is the time when they are submitted. There are two reasons why early bids might receive better allocations. First of all, the investment banker may need information from early bidders to re ne the process of soliciting bids over time. The second reason is the need to create informational cascades, as explained in Welch 1992.
In Table 6 we compare early and late bids. We sort the bids by the date and time that they were rst submitted ignoring the date of subsequent revisions. We de ne the rst quarter of bids as early and the rest as late. We see that early bids receive a slightly more favorable treatment than late bids. However we also see that early bids are larger than late bids, therefore in Table 7 we distinguish between large and small bids. Only small early bids are favored. Table 8 splits the data along the early late dimension as well as bid type dimension i.e. strike limit step. Among limit and step bids, early bids are favored by a substantial amount. If we i n terpret limit bids as more informed than strike bids, then the investment banker is primarily encouraging informed bidders to act early. This can be understood as the information being more valuable when received early or that an early bid is more likely to encourage more bidding if the early bid is perceived as informed.
Finally, w e w ant to know whether the investment banker favors regular investors who participate in many issues. In Section 2 we mentioned that Spindt 1989 and Wilhelm 1990 argue that bookbuilding is a better method than an auction where the rules are set in advance since it allows the investment banker to build a reputation with his clients; participation in future offerings is contingent on broad participation in past o erings. These frequent buyers act as insurance, since they will buy shares in unsuccessful issues also. Alternatively, frequent bidders are simply the investment banker's friends, and for this reason they obtain a more favorable treatment.
We split the bidders into three categories. Those who bid in 10 or more issues are de ned as high frequency bidders. Medium frequency bidders are those who participated in 3 to 9 issues. Bidders that only participated in one or two issues are de ned as low frequency. When sorting into these groups we account for all bids including those which were cancelled and limit bids where the limit price was below the issue price. Missed limit prices are certainly relevant because they did provide information to the banker. Even cancelled bids are relevant as they are evidence of frequent contact between the investor and the banker.
In Table 9 we see that high frequency bidders are favored relative to medium frequency bidders. Low frequency bidders get the worst allocations. This can be interpreted as the frequent bidders being perceived as more informed by the bank. Alternatively, the frequent bidders can beinterpreted as regular clients or friends of the investment banker who are favored.
Note that low frequency bidders submitted smaller bids than high and medium frequency bidders. In Table 10 , we sort the bidders by frequency and by bid size. We nd that both among large bids and small bids high frequency bidders are most favored and low frequency bidders are least favored. For each level of frequency, we nd that large bids are favored relative to small bids. In Table 11 , we see that the discrimination in favor of frequent bidders is robust to the bid type. Whether the bid is a strike, limit or step, high frequency bidders are most favored and infrequent bidders are least favored.
Table 11 also shows that for bidders of all frequencies, limit bids and step bids are favored relative to strike bids. If a greater allocation is payment for information, then this suggests that limit bids are informed even when they come from low frequency bidders.
4.2.
Regressions. An alternative way to look at the previous results is using regressions. The dependent variable is the normalized rationing NRAT.
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The independent v ariables try to capture three types of e ect: the size e ect, the information e ect and the frequency e ect. 12 The alternatives of using allocations or raw rationing are susceptible to excessive heteroskedasticity.
For the size e ect we use two types of independent variable. The rst obvious one is the percentage bid BID. However, we saw in Table 3 that most of the di erence is in the two largest quartiles, while the use of BID would impose a linear relationship. Therefore, we also de ne two dummy v ariables: one DQUART3 takes the value one if the bid percentage is in the third quartiles, while the second DQUART4 takes the value one if the bid percentage is in the fourth quartile. For the information e ect, we use a dummy for limit bids DLIMIT, a dummy for step bids DSTEP and a dummy v ariable for early bidders DEARLY, which takes value one if the bid is one of the rst 25. For the reputation e ect we h a v e t w o dummies: one for high frequency bidders DHFRQ and one for medium frequency DMFRQ.
We also introduce four new variables which w e did not consider in the tables. The rst one is a dummy which takes value one if the bid has been revised DREV. The interpretation of this variable could be di erent. On one hand it could mean exactly the opposite of DEARLY; if the investment bank wants to reward a bid submitted early, then it will penalize a bid which i s c hanged and therefore the coe cient should be negative. On the other hand, if the information about the value of the shares does change over the period in which the book is built|for example because as more people are paying attention to the issue, the institution is aggregating more information| then DREV is capturing additional information that the bidder is providing to the investment banker over time. The second one is a dummy which takes the value one if the bidder's nationality i s the same as the nationality o f the issuing company DCOUNTRY. Also this variable is trying to capture an information e ect andit should be positive if we expect the institutions of the same country to have better information. Finally, w e include a dummy variable DMAN which is set to 1 if the manager accepting the bid is the investment bank itself i.e. the bookrunner or a foreign subsidiary of the bank.
In Table 12 we present the results. Regressions 1 to 3 di er only with regard to which variable was used to capture the size e ect. In Regression 1 we use the bid percentage. However, in Regression 2, where we used DQUART3 and DQUART4, their signi cance and the R-squared of the regression increased. In Regression 3 we use all three variables. Comparing Regression 2 to Regression 3, we can see that the coe cient of the bid percentage is signi cant but the R-squared is not changing: overall, adding bid percentage as an independent variable does not seem to improve much. Therefore, from now on we will consider Regression 2 a s our basic regression, to which we will add any other change. Looking at Regression 2, we can see that DMAN is the most economically and statistically signi cant v ariable, suggesting that the investment banker strongly favors those who submitted a bid through him. This should be expected, as the book-runner retains a larger portion of the investment banking fees if his clients purchase the shares. Almost all the results con rm what we already found in the tables; the size of a bid is positive and signi cant. Similarly, limit and step bids are favored as are frequent bidders. However, DEARLY is negative and signi cant. The coe cient of DREV is positive and signi cant: this seems to support the hypothesis that a revision is providing more information to the investment banker. Similarly, the coe cient of DCOUNTRY is positive and signi cant, suggesting that local investors are favored|perhaps for informational reasons.
The values of the coe cients on the dummies can be interpreted as the extra allocation given to those bids. For example, limit bids will be allocated 20 more than similar strike bids.
We perform a White test for heteroskedasticity on the regression residuals. We nd that there is not heteroskedasticity. We also compute robust t-statistics that are very similar to the reported t-statistics.
The results of the regression con rm that the investment banker favors limit bids. However, if limit bids systematically obtained more shares, then any investor could submit a limit bid with an extremely high limit price which would practically be equivalent to a strike bid. Lower limit bids may be more informative because the bidder is bearing the cost of possibly missing the issue price. One could argue that the investment banker should favor lower limit prices in order to encourage truthful revelation. This would bevery di erent from most auction allocations, but it would besimilar to the mise en vente auction for IPOs in France see Biais and FaugeronCrouzet 1998. In order to look for this e ect, we run Regression 4 only for limit orders, including a new variable PLIMIT which is given by P L ,P I P I , i.e., the percentage by which the limit price exceeds the issue price. However, the coe cient is non signi cant.
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It is possible that each issue has unique characteristics which are not captured by the variables in the regressions. For example, a particular issuing company might in uence the investment banker to favor a certain set of investors. We control for this in Regression 5 by including 39 intercepts -one for each issue. Qualitatively, the results do not change much. DEARLY is still not signi cant. The test of simultaneous signi cance shows that the dummies are jointly very signi cant.
In Table 12 we h a v e tried to identify which t ypes of bids or bidders convey more information, we h a v e included all of them in the regression and obtained results consistent with theory. In particular, we claimed that some of the variables captured an information e ect. In Table 13 we try to look deeper into the issue of information. For example, if bidders with the same nationality a s the issuing company identi ed with the dummy DCOUNTRY are better informed then limit bids from these investors are particularly informative. Therefore we should expect that among all bids from bidders of the same country, step and limit bids obtain more than strike bids. Similarly, if a revision give more information, a revision with a limit bid or step bid is giving more information than a revision with a strike bid.
We de ne three new variables: LARGE includes the two highest quartiles; NOT-STRIK combines both limit and step bids; FREQ combines both high and medium frequency bidders. Regression 6 considers the interaction between revision and other explanatory variables. The result is that revisions which are done through a limit or step bid or by an investor with the same nationality do get a more favorable treatment. This is consistent with our explanation that the reason a revision was getting a more favorable treatment was because it was providing information over time. We nd now that the more informative t ypes of revision obtain indeed a more favorable treatment.
Regression 7 is looking instead at the timing e ect. In Table 12 we saw that bidding early had a negative e ect. However, Table 8 seemed to suggest that limit and step bid were favoured if they were submitted early. Regression 7 does con rm that result: the only case in which bidding early does make a di erence is when the bid is providing special information, i.e. it is a limit or step bid. This is consistent with the cascade theory.
Regression 8 looks at the di erence between strike and non strike bids and conrms the results above. Finally, Regression 9 looks at the e ect of the variable DCOUNTRY. The interaction with the revision con rms the result of Regression 6. The surprising result is that large bids are less favored if the bidder comes from the same country of the issuer. One possible explanation is that the issuer may bemore interested in having dispersed ownership locally.
Notice that the interaction between FREQ and the other variables is never signicant. This seems to con rm the theory that the favorable treatment given to frequent bidders is not due to information, but either to an insurance e ect or to friendship". 4.3. IPOs vs. Secondary Issues. Our data set includes both IPOs and secondary issues. However, there is more ex-ante price uncertainty in IPOs than in secondary issues. Therefore, we run regressions again separating IPOs and secondary issues to see if the same allocation criteria are used in both. Table 14 displays the results.
The rst thing to notice is that the same results hold for both IPOs and secondary issues, con rming the fact that the investment bank is behaving more or less in the same way in both cases. We observe that large bidders are more favoured in secondary issues than in IPOs. Surprisingly, limit bids appear to be more favored in secondary issues than IPOs despite the fact that one would expect a greater degree of private information in IPOs. This last result could be due to the fact that since there is in general less uncertainty about the value of the rm and more about the market demand. Therefore the indication of interest of the limit bids are particularly useful.
However, revisions and bidders of the same country seem to receive a more favourable treatment in IPOs.
4.4. Returns. In the two previous subsections we i n v estigated whether some types of bids or bidders received more shares as a proportion of their bid than others. Whenever we found this e ect, we assumed these bids were receiving a more favorable treatment. While investors who receive larger allocations can usually be considered favored, obtaining more shares is not necessarily an advantage. If the price subsequently drops, then the investor will wish he had not obtained so many shares.
In this section, we look at whether what we called favorable treatment does indeed translate into higher returns for the investors. One possibility would be to use the investors' returns as dependent v ariable. However, in that case we w ould not be able to distinguish whether the investors obtained high returns because the investment banker favoured them or because they were informed and bid only in the right issues. Therefore, we instead investigate which t ypes of bids get higher allocations when the issue is successful.
There are two w a ys to determine whether or not an issue was successful. The rst way is to look at the aftermaket prices. The problem is that the investment bank does not know the aftermarket returns when deciding on the allocations. Thus, using that measure would be assuming that the investment banker has some additional information that would better help him predict the aftermarket price. The second measure is the oversubscription of the issue. In Table 15 , Regression 11 captures oversubscription. In this case we are de nitely looking at information that the investment bank has. In Regression 12, where we look at returns, we may belooking at the information of the bank, but we may becapturing private information that the bidders have regarding the true value of the shares.
In Regression 11 we multiply the bid characteristics of the basic Regression 2 by the oversubscription of the bid. For example, a positive coe cient on both HFRQ and HFRQ*OVERSUB, means that high frequency investors not only received more shares on average, but were even more favored when the issue was heavily oversub-scribed. Regression 12 is similar to Regression 11 but instead of the oversubscription we use the aftermarket returns, computed as the percentage return between the issue price and the rst available end-of-day aftermarket price.
By looking rst at Regression 11 we see that high frequency investors obtain more shares when the issue is more oversubscribed, suggesting that the investment bank is trying to favor them when it knows the issue is a success. One possible interpretation of the positive coea cient for frequent bidders is that these are the friends", who obtain a more favorable treatment from the investment bank. Another way to interpret it according to the Benveniste and Spindt 1989 story is the following: frequent bidders do provide an insurance, but they must receive a return in exchange. Therefore, the investment bank will discriminate in their favor when it knows that the issue is oversubscribed, since in this way it will provide them with a positive returns that compensates for their insurance.
On the other hand, the coe cients of DREV*OVERSUB and DCOUNTRY*OVERSUB are negative and signi cant, while DLIMIT*OVERSUB is negative but not signicant. This suggests that although these bids receive better allocations overall, they are less favored when oversubscription is high. This might simply be the result of the investment banker favoring other bidders when oversubscription is high.
However, we h a v e i n terpreted the high frequency bidders as customers of the bank who are not necessarily informed, while the other type of bids were interpreted as informed bids. Therefore, it can be that the investment banker does not think it is necessary to correct the allocation to the informed bidders based on the oversubscription, since they have their own informed opinion about the value of the shares. The fact that the investment bank does not appear to favor this type of bid as much when oversubscription is high may b e i n terpreted in the following way: investors who submit limit bids have private information about the value of the issue, which may not bere ected in the immediate oversubscription. The investment banker does not have to worry about giving a more favorable treatment to the limit bidder, because the limit bidder is already choosing when and how to bid based on his own private information. This is consistent with the results in Regression 12 where we use the returns. In fact, the negative coe cients become positive|or at least non signi cant. It is therefore possible that although the bidders seemed to receive an unfavorable treatment, if they were really informed and therefore predicting better than the investment bank the after market return, they were actually making positive pro ts. This seems to suggest that the investment bank is favouring the frequent investors only on the base of the information contained in the oversubscription. Since there is a positive but weak correlation between oversubscription and positive returns, this is mildly re ected in the returns.
Conclusions
We h a v e analyzed the book of these equity issues that were allocated using the bookbuilding mechanism. Under this mechanism, the investment banker does not follow any formal rule regarding share allocations. However, we h a v e found some regularities in the way that the investment banker rations shares to investors. We have found that the banker favors limit bids, step bids, revised bids and bidders from the issuers country. We h a v e i n terpreted this as favoring the informed bidders. This is consistent with the bank extracting price information by compensating informed bidders.
Favorable allocations are also given to large bidders, frequent bidders and those that submit their bids directly to the bookrunner. We h a v e not found strong evidence that early bidders are favored, nor do we nd evidence that the level of a bid's price limit a ects the allocations. These results hold for both IPOs and secondary issues.
In addition, frequent bidders are rewarded with extra shares in successful issues. However, limit bidders may face some adverse selection and are less favored in successful equity issues. It appears that the investment bank is using the aggregate information in the booktocompensate regular customers.
